Michigan Journal of International Law
Volume 19

Issue 2

1998

Conceptual, Methodological and Substantive Issues Entwined in
Studying Compliance
Harold K. Jacobson
University of Michigan

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil
Part of the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Harold K. Jacobson, Conceptual, Methodological and Substantive Issues Entwined in Studying
Compliance, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 569 (1998).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol19/iss2/8

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal
of International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

AFTERWORD

CONCEPTUAL, METHODOLOGICAL AND

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ENTWINED IN
STUDYING COMPLIANCE
Harold K. Jacobson*
INTRODUCTION
In his insightful introduction to this collection Jose E. Alvarez refers
to the popularity of studies of "why nations behave." He explains this
popularity as a response to the increasing waves of international regulation that have occurred during the closing years of the twentieth century,
regulation that frequently involves issues previously left to nation states.
As one who has been a participant over the past decade in an effort to
discover answers to the question that Alvarez put so clearly,' I am
pleased by the broad interest that the subject has gained and feel privileged to have an opportunity to comment on a range of studies beyond
our own, to explore what has been accomplished by the collective effort,
and to frame issues that could benefit from further investigation and
urge that this research be undertaken. As a political scientist, I am grateful to be able to state in a legal journal my firm belief that this topic
must be explored jointly by legal scholars and social scientists and to
express gratitude to those legal scholars who have worked on the topic
with social scientists. These two broad themes will define my essay. Examining the articles in this collection will provide a base but not the
only base for my comments.

* Jesse Siddal Reeves Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scientist,
Center for Political Studies, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. Ph.D.,
Yale University (1955); M.A., Yale University (1952); B.A., University of Michigan (1950).
1. The Research Consortium on National Compliance with International Environmental Agreements of the Committee on Research on Global Environmental Change of the
Social Science Research Council. Edith Brown Weiss, Francis Cabell Brown Professor of
International Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, and I have chaired this consortium. The principal product of the consortium's research, Engaging Countries:Strengthening
Compliance with International Environmental Accords, will be published in the fall of 1998
by the MIT Press.
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To WHAT EXTENT Do NATIONS BEHAVE?
At the outset, I must raise a cautionary flag concerning one aspect
of the condition of compliance studies that was generally so accurately
characterized by Alvarez. He stated that the question of why nations behave is seen by some as more relevant than the traditional question of
whether nations behave. True, but our stressing the belief that the question of why is more relevant risks our assuming that we know more than
we actually do about the extent to which nations comply with international norms, both formal binding obligations and soft law. Louis
Henkin's much quoted statement, "It is probably true that almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of
their obligations almost all of the time,' '2 is undoubtedly correct but
when it was stated it begged specification of the word almost which appears in the sentence four times. Thirty years after the sentence first
appeared in print, our ability to specify what almost means in each of
the instances when it is used in the sentence is little better than it was
then.
Indeed, the issue has become even more complicated, partly because
of our improved understanding of the nature of compliance and partly
because of the increasing waves of international regulation to which Alvarez referred. It is more complicated because we now know that
particularly with respect to the obligations that have come into force
more recently compliance is not an either or issue. It is not the case that
nations can always easily be judged to be in compliance or not with
their obligations, rather the issue frequently is to determine to what extent are nations in compliance. To illustrate the point with a trivial
example, drivers may obey speed limits on some but not all roads, or not
exceed seventy mile per hour limits, but regularly drive thirty-five miles
per hour in thirty mile per hour zones. We could specify that the driver
was in compliance some of the time with some of the speed limits, but
the question that is posed in international relations is usually more general. It would be, "are speed limits obeyed?" Analogous situations to
this trivial example arise with treaties such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species3 that impose multiple and
frequently complex obligations. Moreover, as Abram Chayes and Antonia H. Chayes have so clearly demonstrated, judging compliance

2. Louis HENKiN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979).
3. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U. S. T.
1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249.
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frequently involves interpretation
of exactly what the obligations mean
4
in complicated contexts.
Systematic knowledge about the extent of compliance of nations
with the many international obligations that they have accepted is relatively limited. We know a good bit about compliance with traditional
arms control and trade agreements. The number of parties to many arms
traditional control treaties is limited, the obligations are relatively clear,
and the stakes involved if nations did not comply could be very high.
Governments and international governmental organizations (IGOs),
particularly the Western European Union, the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe, and the International Atomic Energy
Agency, have elaborate systems to monitor arms control. Because trade
agreements can involve issues of considerable monetary importance,
private parties and governments both have strong interests in monitoring
them carefully, and the World Trade Organization has robust dispute
settlement mechanisms that are used extensively.
We know considerably less about the extent of compliance with international norms that involve social welfare, human rights, and the
environment. The International Labor Organization has long had highly
developed mechanisms for checking compliance with international labor
conventions,5 but beyond this international governmental organizations
have generally not been deeply engaged in measuring compliance until
recently. We also know less about compliance with new forms of arms
control and trade agreements. It was only in the run-up to the 1992
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in
Rio de Janeiro that concern with compliance with international environmental accords became a major issue.6 Prior to that time the evidence
that was available was primarily anecdotal and supplied by nongovernmental organizations. This information was useful, but it was not
systematic.
If we are to sharpen our understanding of why nations behave, we
must understand better than we do now the extent to which and the cir4. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA H. CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE wrrH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995).
5. See ERNST B. HAAS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ACTION: THE CASE OF
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (1970); ERNEST ALFRED LANDY, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION: THIRTY YEARS OF I.L.O. EXPERIENCE (1966); Virginia A.
Leary, Nonbinding Accords in the Field of Labor, in INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH
NONBINDING ACCORDS 247-64 (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1998).
6. See THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS (Peter
H. Sand ed. 1992); Survey of Existing International Agreements and Instruments and Its
Follow Up, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/PC/103, Addendum 1 (1992); U.S. GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ARE NOT WELL MONITORED
(GAO/RCED 92-43, 1992).
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cumstances in which nations behave in accord with the norms that they
have accepted. It is obvious from what we know that the behavior of
some nations is closer to the international norms they have accepted
than that of others, that nations follow some norms more than they follow other norms, and that nations' behavior with respect to international
norms changes oyer time. Calibrating these variations is an essential
step toward understanding better the causal mechanisms that produce
them.
The articles in this collection reflect this weakness in our knowledge. With the partial exception of the contribution by David S. Ardia,
there is very little information in them about the actual behavior of nations. In his contribution, Ardia eloquently describes weaknesses and
lacunae in the legal structure of the regimes for ocean management and
then adduces evidence of the decline in ocean fish and mammal stocks
to support his conclusion that the regimes require strengthening. He
makes a strong case for his argument.
The argument could be refined and strengthened through additional
research. During the same period that fish and mammal stocks have declined, the world's population has increased substantially and dietary
habits have changed, increasing the demand for proteins and particularly
for fish, thus the problem has become more complex. In addition, fishing
techniques have altered. Different regimes for different fish and mammal
stocks have had differing degrees of success, and the behavior of States in
these regimes has varied. In his study of international oil pollution at sea,
Ronald Mitchell vividly demonstrated that compliance can be dramatically improved when treaty provisions take into account actors' incentives
and their material and managerial capacities.8 For example, when the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships was
modified to rely on equipment standards rather than discharge limitations,
compliance became much easier to monitor and increased sharply. Oran
Young has shown how complex the domestic politics concerning fisheries
management within a single country, the United States, can be. 9 Because
of the importance of the United States as a market and the U.S. fishing
industry, any scheme for strengthening compliance would have to take
account of the incentives of various actors within the U.S. political scene.
The broad point is that Ardia's proposal for an International Marine
7. See M. J. Peterson, International Fisheries Management, in PETER M. HAAS,
ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & MARC A. LEVY, INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES OF
EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 249-305 (1993).
8. See RONALD MITCHELL, INTENTIONAL OIL POLLUTION AT SEA: ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY AND TREATY COMPLIANCE (1994).
9. See ORAN R. YOUNG, RESOURCE REGIMES: NATURAL RESOURCES AND SOCIAL
INSTITUTIONS (1982).
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Monitoring and Coordination Agency could be refined and strengthened if
more were known about the behavior of nations.
Ardia does rely heavily on one of the generalizations that has
emerged from the empirical work on compliance. All empirical studies
of compliance have shown how effective non-governmental organizations can be and how important they are to strengthening compliance
especially with obligations dealing with social welfare, human rights,
and the environment. 1o
We need to learn more about the extent of compliance. This would
provide a strong foundation for analyses to improve understanding of
why nations behave, which would in turn enhance our capacity to offer
effective prescriptions.
APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF COMPLIANCE

In his contribution to this collection, Benedict Kingsbury argues that
the concept of compliance does not and cannot have meaning "except as
a function of prior theories of the nature and the operation of the law to
which it pertains."" He shows clearly that different theories of international law offer different explanations for compliance.
A positivist political scientist, which I profess to be, would accept
these different explanations as hypotheses to be investigated. Compliance may in some measure be a matter of rational calculation of costs
and benefits, and it may also in some measure be the result of individuals adhering to their internalized sense that laws should be obeyed. It is
true as Kingsbury maintains that social scientists have not found it easy
to probe and measure internalized norms, but doing this has been the
core of a great deal of social science research, and this research has produced much useful knowledge. 2 Internalized norms are very much part
of the conceptual framework of positivist social scientists.
Note that I have stated these two possible explanations so that they
can be regarded as complementary. Most positivist social scientists believe that there are usually multiple rather than single explanations for
behavior and take it as one of their tasks to attempt to ascertain the relative influence of each of the several explanations. In our study of
10. Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, Strengthening Compliance with Interna-

tional Environmental Accords: Preliminary Observations from a Collaborative Project,
1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 119 (1995).
11. Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Competing Conceptions of InternationalLaw,
19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345, 346 (1998).
12. For a good summary of some of this work see Micropolitical Theory, Vol. 2 in

HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (Fred I. Greenstein & Nelson W. Polsby eds., 1975).
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compliance with international environmental accords, Edith Brown
Weiss and I and our collaborators, 3 found that compliance was affected
by four clusters of variables: (1) Characteristics of the Activity; (2)
Characteristics of the Accord; (3) Characteristics of the International
Environment; and (4) and Characteristics of the Country. Cost-benefit
calculations were involved in only a few of the more than thirty variables that we determined had an effect on compliance. This list of
variables included attitudes and values of both general publics and leadership elites.
Although positivist social scientists believe that there are generally
multiple explanations for behavior, we also seek to discover the most
parsimonious explanations possible. Thus, when we find a variable that
explains a large proportion of the variance in behavior, we emphasize it.
George Downs contribution to this collection is in this tradition. Drawing on the insights of game theory, he develops an elegant theory
concerning the circumstances in which enforcement will make important contributions to compliance.
Kingsbury also argues that theoretical work is needed to clarify and
make cognizable within standard international relations theories the
distinctive features of law. I could not agree more with this argument.
For many years after the Second World War, social scientists studying
international relations ignored institutions, particularly international
law, in their quest to gain a positivist understanding of behavior. Happily that period and the motivations
that led to it are past, and
14
institutions have been rediscovered.
Downs' contribution is an example of the work that is being done by
positivist social scientists in rediscovering institutions. The place of enforcement mechanisms in international accords is very much an
institutional question. Downs' contribution analyzes the interaction between the subject matter covered in a treaty, the characteristics of the
parties, and the relative importance of enforcement mechanisms. It does
not provide a cookbook type recipe for drafting treaties, but it does pro13. Our research consortium included in addition to ourselves: Danae Aitchison,

Murillo Aragao, Anthony Balinga, Laszlo Bencze, Erach Bharucha, Piers Blaikie, Stephen
Bunker, Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes, James Clem, Ellen Comisso, Liz Economy, Fang Xiaoming, James Vincent Feinerman, Koichiro Fujikura, Michael Glennon, Saul
Halfon, Peter Hardy, Allison Hayward, Ronald Herring, Philipp Hildebrand, Takesada Iwahashi, Jasmin Jagada, Sheila Jasanoff, Tim Kessler, Ron Mitchell, Elena Nikitina, Kenneth da
Nobrega, Michel Oksenberg, Jonathan Richards, Gideon Rottem, Alberta Sbragia, Thomas
Schelling, Cheryl Shanks, John A. Mope Simo, Alison Steward, David Vogel, Wu Zijin
Zhang Shuqing, Andrea Ziegler, and William Zimmerman.
14. See JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN N. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE
ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS (1989);
INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER (1989).

ROBERT 0.

KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL
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vide insights that would be useful in such an exercise. In his Foreword,
Alvarez cautions those engaged in compliance studies to avoid quixotic
searches for "recipe books." Downs' contribution shows how scholarship can avoid this and provide knowledge that usefully clarifies policy
choices.
Kingsbury is correct in arguing that the social science project of rediscovering institutions has not been completed and that the
collaboration of positivist social scientists with international legal
scholars can make a useful contribution to this project. The exploration
of why nations behave is a perfect opportunity for this collaboration.
Kingsbury finally argues that not all international legal concerns
about compliance can be encompassed in a positivist project. This is
true, but there is also more to social science than can be encompassed in
a positivist project. Positivist social science seeks to concentrate on
factual statements and to avoid value judgments. Positivism is not the
only philosophical strand in social science. Social criticism has always
been an important component of social science. This has involved both
critiques of existing institutions, policies, and outcomes and also defining more desirable conditions. It is probably the case that normative
orientations have greater prominence in international legal studies than
they do in social science, but there are certainly common elements of
normative work in both streams of scholarship. To date, the social scientists who most actively have been involved in compliance studies have
generally been positivists, but others with different orientations could
and should be enlisted. Their involvement will be increasingly needed as
compliance studies progress from analysis to prescription. Prescriptions
rest on value judgments, which are not the forte of positivists.
THE EXPANDING DOMAIN OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATION

The increasing waves of international regulation to which Alvarez
referred in the Foreword to this collection have expanded greatly the
domain of regulation. As international regulation has expanded into areas that previously were the exclusive province of nation states new
issues regarding compliance have arisen. Procedural innovations have
accompanied the expansion of the domain of international regulation.
The appropriateness and efficacy of these innovations are open questions. Moreover, as international regulation has become more deeply
engaged with issues that previously were dealt with by nation states the
same political and social forces that affect the treatment of these issues
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within nations come into play when nations collectively attempt to deal
with them.
Three contributions in this collection illustrate these points, those by
Christopher C. Joyner, Natasha A. Affolder, and Kenneth J. Vandevelde.
They are particularly interesting because they deal with issuesAntarctica, violations of humanitarian law, and international investment-that are different than those that are usually cited in discussions
of these points; namely, social welfare, human rights, and the environment. Because these three issues involve individual and national
security and significant financial stakes they are often more salient than
the traditional set of issues, and thus the procedural innovations put in
place in these areas probably receive greater immediate scrutiny than
those put in place in other areas. The innovations are interesting in
themselves, as are the contributions they make and the problems they
create. The points that emerge from analysis of them have general applicability.
Joyner shows how the basic commitments set forth in the 1959 Antarctica Treaty 5 have been elaborated into a complex regime that
regulates virtually all aspects of activity in the Antarctic region. The
process of elaborating the regime has involved the adoption of recommended measures. This process developed in an ad hoc manner, then in
1995 was formalized. The recommended measures ultimately become
hard law, but they become soft law as soon as they are adopted, and remain soft law until all Contracting Parties to the Antarctica Treaty
approve them. The process allows great flexibility for governments; it
also provides stimuli for them to come into compliance.
The Contacting Parties to the Antarctica Treaty are collectively
managing a continent and its surrounding waters in ways that are analogous to ways that nation states have managed their territories. National
governments frequently pass broad laws that are then elaborated by
more detailed regulations that are adopted through more flexible procedures. The regulations themselves often contain provisions for
flexibility in implementation. The process that Joyner analyzes is in
many ways like this model. It could be applied in other areas of international regulation, particularly those of social welfare and the
environment. One of the most salient findings of the project on compliance in which I have been engaged is that different countries have
different problems in bringing their practices into compliance with international obligations. The process that Joyner describes seems
admirably suited to dealing with these differences.
15. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794,402 U.N.T.S. 71.
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In her contribution, Affolder deals with the decision of Trial Chamber II of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, "to allow for the
use of measures including confidentiality and anonymity to protect witnesses."'6 This decision has elicited both strong support and strong
criticism." The issues that are involved have been controversial in national legal settings as well, and different countries lean toward different
solutions. Affolder carefully analyzes the sources that the majority ruling and the dissenting opinion relied on to justify their arguments and
conclusions. In terms of developing a broad understanding of compliance, her contribution illustrates how quickly detailed issues of legal
procedure that have not previously been addressed, arise and how complicated it is to settle them. More broadly, her contribution makes it
clear that when penalties are enforced for violations of norms the perceived legitimacy of the procedures through which violations and
penalties are determined is crucially important.
Vandevelde deals with issues relating to compliance raised by Joyner and Affolder in a broader context. He shows how a regime has
developed for the protection of foreign direct investment and describes
this regime. The principal components of the regime are more than
1,300 bilateral investment treaties, more than two-thirds of which have
been concluded since 1990. He argues that foreign direct investment is a
crucial component of a liberal global economy, but for this component
to be secure a multilateral agreement would be essential. This agreement should "deepen the global consensus on liberalization of
investment flows," promote "a commitment to liberalism among domestic investors in host states," and provide "a multilateral framework
for addressing market failures and curbing excessive redistribution programs." 8 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
has been sponsoring negotiations for such an agreement.
Vandevelde is absolutely right that for there to be substantial compliance by nations with a multilateral agreement on foreign direct investment
the first step would have to be to strengthen the global consensus on the
many issues involved, and he correctly perceives that this could not be
achieved unless there were agreed ways of addressing market failures.
16. Natasha A. Affolder, Tadi6, The Anonymous Witness and the Sources of International ProceduralLaw, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 445,446 (1998).
17. See Christine M. Chinkin, Due Process and Witness Anonymity, 91 AM. J. INT'L L.

75 (1997); Monroe Leigh, Witness Anonymity is Inconsistent with Due Process, 91 AM. J.
INT'L L. 75 (1997).
18. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investment
Regime, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 373, 396 (1998).
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Consensus could be developed and strengthened through the negotiations
themselves. The issues involved have been addressed within nation states.
They, however, have not been addressed collectively in a detailed way.
There are differences among nation states in the ways that they have settled the issues. In this broad context of actions that would seriously affect
entire economies, Vandevelde clearly sees the need for the perceived legitimacy of the regulations and the means for enforcing them. The need
for flexibility comes through throughout his analysis.

CONCLUSION

The three contributions on which I have just commented explain
why a traditional subject in international law has achieved renewed
prominence, why new questions have been raised in this traditional
subject matter area, and why the answers that have been given to both
old and new questions have new dimensions. Compliance is a subject
with which international law has long been concerned. Legal scholarship has produced a rich literature on the subject, and the best of this
literature has always been concerned with why nations behave."9
What is new is that the focus of and requirements for international
regulation have expanded. Traditional international regulation dealt with
issues that arose at nations' borders, war and international trade and
matters directly related to these issues such as arms control. Increasingly international regulation deals with issues that arise within nations'
borders. 0 This has been forced by the pressures that a growing global
population has placed on the earth, by increasing economic integration
among nations' economies, and by a growing sensitivity to and desire to
achieve respect for human dignity.
Some aspects of the answers to the question why do nations respect
the norm that States should not use military force to settle territorial
disputes apply to the question how can nations be induced to cease production of ozone depleting substances, but the issues are so different
that there must be a strong presumption that beyond common explanations there are separate explanations in each case. The theoretical and
empirical studies that have been conducted so far demonstrate that this

19. For a relatively recent summary of this traditional scholarship see ROGER FISHER,
IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW (1981).
20. See ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, REGIONALISM, MULTILATERALISM, AND DEEPER
INTEGRATION (1996). The preface to this volume and to the other volumes that have been
produced by the Brookings Studies on Integrating National Economies makes this argument
clearly and sharply.
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is indeed the case. These studies also demonstrate how useful collaboration between international legal scholars and social scientists can be.
Both groups can bring tools that are vital to examining problems of
compliance with international regulations also covering within border
issues.
Exploring why nations behave, if not a new question, certainly has
new aspects. It is a venture that can be enriched by collaboration. This
collection demonstrates both points.

